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This paper studies reputation  formation  and the evolution  over time 
of the incentive  effects  of reputation  to mitigate conflicts of interest 
between  borrowers and lenders.  Borrowers use the proceeds of their 
loans to fund  projects. In the absence of reputation  effects,  borrow- 
ers  have  incentives  to  select  excessively  risky  projects.  If  there  is 
sufficient  adverse  selection,  reputation  will not initially provide  im- 
proved  incentives to borrowers with short credit histories. Over time, 
if a good  reputation  is acquired,  reputation  will provide  improved 
incentives.  General  characteristics  of  markets  in  which  reputation 
takes time to work are identified. 
I.  Introduction 
This  paper  analyzes  the  dynamics  of  an  incentive  problem  between 
borrowers  and  lenders.  The  main  result  is that  incentive  problems  can 
be  most  severe  for  borrowers  with  very  short  track  records  and  be- 
come  less  severe  for  borrowers  who  manage  to acquire  a "good  repu- 
tation."  This  explicit  prediction  about  the  evolution  of  incentives  over 
time  extends  the  existing  work  on  reputation  that  focuses  on  the 
beneficial  effect  of  a long  horizon  in  the  future. 
I  am  grateful  for  useful  comments  from  Elizabeth  Cammack,  Bengt  Holmstrom, 
Tommy  Tan,  Robert  Vishny,  Andrew  Weiss,  an  anonymous  referee,  and  workshop 
participants at Chicago,  Columbia,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  the National 
Bureau  Conference  on Game Theory  and  Finance,  Princeton,  Stanford,  University of 
British Columbia,  University  of California  at Los Angeles,  Wharton,  and Yale. Finan- 
cial support  for this research  was provided  by a Batterymarch  Fellowship,  the Univer- 
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I  follow  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982a)  and  Milgrom  and  Roberts 
(1982)  in  viewing  a  reputation  as  arising  from  learning  over  time 
from  observed  behavior  about  some  exogenous  characteristics  of 
agents. Reputation  effects  on decisions arise when an agent adjusts his 
or her behavior  to influence  data others  use in learning  about him. 
Reputation  is important  when  there  is a diverse  pool  of  relevant 
exogenous  characteristics  in an  observationally  equivalent  group  of 
agents because  this implies  that there is a substantial amount  to learn 
about  an  agent.  My  model  analyzes  the joint  influence  of  adverse 
selection  and  moral  hazard  on  the  ability of  reputation  to eliminate 
the  conflict  of  interest  between  borrowers  and  lenders  about  the 
choice of risk in investment  decisions.  If, initially, there is widespread 
adverse  selection  (a large  proportion  of  borrowers  with undesirable 
characteristics),  reputation  effects  will be  too  weak  to eliminate  the 
conflict  of  interest  for  borrowers  with  short  track records.  Adverse 
selection  becomes  less severe  as time produces  a longer  track record, 
and a good  reputation  can eventually  become  strong enough  to elimi- 
nate the conflict of interest for borrowers with a long record of repay- 
ment without  a default.  Alternatively,  if there is not substantial initial 
adverse  selection,  reputation  can  begin  to  work  immediately.  Two 
examples  in Section  VI  illustrate these  points explicitly. 
A  reputation  that  takes  time  to  begin  to  work  implies  that  new 
borrowers  (with short  track records)  will face  more  severe  incentive 
problems  and  would  be  the  ones  most  likely  to  utilize  costly  tech- 
nologies  for dealing  with such problems,  such as restrictive covenants 
in bond indentures  (see Smith and Warner 1979) and additional mon- 
itoring  by a financial  intermediary  (see  Diamond  1984,  1988).  The 
model focuses on the study of debt markets but has implications about 
the dynamics  of reputation  formation  in general.1 The  general  char- 
acteristics of markets in which reputation  takes time to begin to work 
are discussed  in the conclusion. 
An  implication  of  most  existing  models  of  reputation,  especially 
Holmstrom  (1982),  is that the effect  of  reputation  is strongest  at the 
start of  an agent's  "career" and does  not take time to begin  to work. 
This  occurs  because  the  amount  of  information  an action can reveal 
about one's type is highest  in the beginning  when there are few previ- 
ous  data  about  actions  (and  because  the  horizon  can  only  get 
shorter).2  This  implies  that  there  would  be a strong  effort  put  into 
' For some  early studies  of  reputation  in debt markets,  see Spatt (1983)  and Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1983). 
2 There  has  been  some  previous  analysis  of  reputation  building.  In  the  two-sided 
uncertainty version of Kreps and  Wilson (1 982a),  "weak" types follow a mixed strategy 
between  playing  tough  or weak,  and  enough  repeated  realizations of  tough  behavior 
convince others  that one  is probably not weak, building one's reputation.  Milgrom and 830  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
having  a good  beginning  to one's  track record.  This  previous  work 
focuses on the incentive  effects  of the prospect of having a reputation 
in  the  future  rather  than  the  effects  of  one's  current  reputation. 
Other models  of reputation,  such as Fama (1980)  and Klein and Lef- 
fler  (1981),  are silent  on  the  dynamics  of  the strength  of  reputation 
effects. 
My model  begins  with an observationally  equivalent  cohort of risk- 
neutral  borrowers  with  no  track record.  One  type  of  borrower  has 
available two projects (which arrive each period): a safe project with a 
high  expected  return  and  a negative  net  present  value  risky project 
with a low expected  return  (but a high maximum  return). The  incen- 
tive  problem  is  that  the  debt  contract  might  provide  incentives  to 
choose  the  risky, less valuable  project. There  are two other  indistin- 
guishable  types  of  borrowers:  those  who  have  access only  to a risky 
project and  those  who  have  access only  to a safe project. 
Imperfect  information  about  borrowers  leads  to  different  types 
being  lumped  together  and  initially  treated  identically:  all  will  be 
charged  the  same  initial interest  rate.3 Interest  rates charged  in the 
future  and the prospects  for borrowing  in the future  will depend  on 
the information  that later becomes  available; a borrower's repayment 
record  (the "track record") will provide  this information.  Apart from 
information  that is unrelated  to repayment  history (such as account- 
ing information),  all situations  in which there  is no default  are indis- 
tinguishable.  The  investment  project  chosen  by  a  borrower  is  not 
observed  by lenders.  The  most  favorable  message  a repayment  his- 
tory can  provide  is a lack of  default.  Because  many borrowers  who 
select risky projects do not default,  it takes a long time to indicate that 
safe  projects have been  selected. 
Ex  post  project  returns  are  borrowers'  private  information:  out- 
siders  cannot  observe  the  ex  post  profitability because  the entrepre- 
neur can appropriate  some of the returns to himself. This implies that 
financial contracts cannot depend  directly on this information,  ruling 
out equity contracts.  Lenders  know the proportion  of each borrower 
type.  The  interest  rate charged  in the  initial period  (for one-period 
zero-coupon  bonds)  is set  such  that,  given  the  proportions,  lenders 
receive  a competitive  expected  return.  The  higher  the proportion  of 
borrowers who choose  the risky project, the higher the rate. After one 
Roberts (1982)  also allow a type that cannot  play tough,  and this can cause reputation 
building  in  the  initial  period  of  their  model.  Neither  paper  focuses  on  reputation 
acquisition, and because actions are assumed  to be observable, neither is consistent with 
a given agent choosing  the weak action in the beginning  and then later switching to the 
strong  action. 
3  In the model,  ex ante separation  by choice  of contract before  any borrowing  takes 
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period,  some  borrowers  default  and  some  do  not.  The  class of  non- 
defaulters  is now  a more  select  group:  the  proportion  of  those  with 
only  risky  projects  has  declined.  The  second-period  interest  rate 
charged  to this group  will be less than the initial rate, and this decline 
continues  over  time  for the class of  nondefaulters.  With a long  time 
horizon,  these  reduced  rates  for  a borrower  who  does  not  default 
imply that the present  value of the borrower's rents for any constant 
investment  decision  rises over  time:  the  reputation  itself  becomes  a 
valuable asset, and a single  default  causes a large decline  in its value. 
This loss of value arises because default  leads to a cutoff of credit (or, 
more  generally,  to an increase  in the interest  rate charged). 
The  value of a good  reputation  rises over time, as does the cost of a 
default.  Therefore,  over time, the relative payoff  of the risky project 
(a very large payoff  when it has a favorable outcome)  declines  relative 
to a safe but profitable  project. If there is sufficient adverse selection, 
then  a typical  equilibrium  path  for  a borrower  with  access  to both 
types of projects is to choose  risky projects when "young" and, if able 
to  survive  long  enough  without  a default,  to switch to safe  projects 
from that point  forward.  In this formulation,  reputation  is important 
because  it becomes  a valuable asset worth  protecting.4 
The  balance  of  the  paper  is organized  as follows:  Section  II  de- 
scribes the setup of the model.  Section III outlines the borrowing and 
lending  arrangements  each  period  and  studies  the one-period  hori- 
zon.  Sections  IV and V provide  analysis of the details of the model's 
equilibrium.  Section IV derives optimal project choice for given inter- 
est rates and interest rates for given project choice. Section V analyzes 
the  endgame,  the  periods  near  the  horizon.  Section  VI  presents  a 
special case of  the  model  to make the main points about what deter- 
mines  the evolution  of reputation  effects  over time. Section VII  gen- 
eralizes  the  characterization  to the  general  model.  Section  VIII  con- 
cludes  the  paper. 
II.  The  Basic  Model:  Technology,  Endowments, 
and  Preferences 
All  borrowers  and  lenders  are  risk neutral.  Lenders  receive  an en- 
dowment  of  inputs  each  period,  and  each  has  access  to  a constant 
returns  to  scale technology  for  storing  endowment  within  a period, 
converting  it  to  a consumption  good  at  the  end  of  a  period.  This 
' This feature  of the collateral-like  incentive  value of an asset that depreciates  in case 
of  default  is also present  in  Merton  (1978),  where  it arises in the case of a bank that 
prepays  for  many  years  of  deposit  insurance,  and  failure  implies  that  it can  issue 
insured  deposits  for only a few of those  years. The  difference  is that it arises endoge- 
nously  in this formulation  and  is not necessarily  present  in the initial time periods. 832  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
technology  returns r units of output  at the end of a period per unit of 
input at the beginning  of the period.  Inputs  must be stored  (or used 
as an input  in a project  described  below) within a period  before  it is 
possible  to  consume  them.  In  an  attempt  to  model  lenders  as  an 
anonymous  capital  market  rather  than  a  financial  institution,  I  as- 
sume  that  a given  lender  exists  for  only  one  period,  implying  that 
borrowers  face a new  set of  lenders  each  period.  The  implication  of 
this assumption  is that reputation  in the form  of a borrower's credit 
history is the only intertemporal  linkage. There  is an infinite number 
of potential  lenders  each period.  There  is no commitment  technology 
available  to  lenders.  Lenders  cannot  commit  themselves  to  take ac- 
tions in the future  (or at the end of a given period) that are not then in 
their ex  post interest,  even  if this would  be beneficial  ex ante. 
Borrowers  receive  no endowment  but have access to indivisible in- 
vestment  projects each period  (and do not have storage  technology). 
They  are indistinguishable  from lenders  (but contracts for borrowers 
turn  out  to  be  unattractive  to  lenders,  and  vice  versa,  so  this is an 
unnecessary  assumption).  There  are three  sorts of  projects, and  the 
set of  projects  available to each  borrower  is his private information. 
Borrowers  can commit  to some  degree  by writing contracts each pe- 
riod that depend  on  publicly observed  variables. 
There  are three  types  of  borrowers:  Type  G borrowers  have one 
safe project each period.  They  can invest one (dollar) and receive G > 
r at the  end  of  the  period.  Type  B borrowers  have  one  risky, low- 
expected-return  project  each  period.  They  can invest one,  and with 
probability HB  <  1, the project returns B (where HBB < rand  B >  G); 
with  probability  1  -  [IB,  it returns  zero.  Type  BG borrowers  have 
their choice  each  period  between  either  one  of two projects, but not 
both.  One  project  is  identical  to  that  of  type  G's and  the  other  is 
similar to that of type B's, except  the probability of its returning  B is 
H?B5 
Let the initial population  of borrowers contain a fractionfG of type 
G's, fB  of  type  B's, and fBG of  type  BG's. These  fractions  are public 
information.  The  returns  on  the risky projects are all independently 
distributed.  A borrower's type is private information,  and all borrow- 
ers  initially  appear  identical.  In  addition,  the  realized  output  of  a 
project  is private  information  observed  only  by the  borrower.  This 
makes  it difficult  to make  a borrower's  payments  depend  on a proj- 
ect's realized  return.  There  is, however,  a costly liquidation  technol- 
ogy that borrowers can commit to use in financial contracts contingent 
on  any publicly  observed  action  or outcome.  This  technology  allows 
' It is simplest  to  think  about  the  case  in which  11 =  HB,  and  the  risky project  is 
identical  to that of  type B borrowers.  The  extra generality  is stated simply because all 
our  results  hold  for  1I  <  HB as  well. REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  833 
the  output  of  the  project  to be seized  before  the borrower  can con- 
sume it. It is extremely  costly to do this: it destroys the output,  so the 
value  then  observed  by  the  public  is  always  zero  if  the  project  is 
liquidated.  This  limits  the  liquidation  and  bankruptcy  process  to 
working as a contract enforcement  device that is costly to utilize. This 
corresponds  to  the  role  of  liquidation  in  the  world;  it is used  as a 
threat rather than a universally  used  information  service. If an alter- 
native  assumption  were  made  that costly liquidation  made  the  real- 
ized  value  of  project  output  observable  to  the  public,  liquidation 
would  be useful  in determining  the type of the borrower.  In particu- 
lar,  it  would  then  allow  those  with  successful  risky  projects  to  be 
distinguished  from  those  with  safe  projects.  Even  without  such  an 
informational  role,  liquidation  is useful  in  providing  incentives  for 
repayment.  It serves to prevent  the borrower from following  a policy 
of  "take the  money  and run." 
Lenders  in each period observe each borrower's history of defaults. 
They  know  the  dates  on  which  a borrower  has  borrowed  and  on 
which  there  was liquidation.  This  is assumed  to be the only informa- 
tion available about the past: the series of past interest rates paid is not 
observed.  An  earlier  version  of  this paper  (Diamond  1986)  uses  the 
more general  assumption  that all past interest rates are observed  and 
obtains  identical  outcomes  to those  found  under  this assumption.6 
Borrowers  maximize  discounted  expected  consumption  over T pe- 
riods,  where  T is finite  but very  large  (we take the  limit as T  ->  o). 
Assume  finite T because  infinite T introduces  many equilibria that are 
not  limits  as  T ->  o  (see  Dybvig  and  Spatt  1980).  Borrowers  make 
decisions  to  maximize  discounted  expected  consumption,  given  by 
ET=  1E(ct) * dt, where  ct is the  realization  of the consumption  random 
variable et in period  t, and d is the discount  factor that discounts  end- 
of-period  expected  consumption  to its beginning-of-period  value. As- 
sume  d <  1, implying  that borrowers  discount  the future. 
To  focus  on  the  importance  of  a long  time  horizon  in  providing 
incentives,  assume  that with a one-period  horizon  (with T =  1), type 
BG borrowers  would  select risky projects. The  restriction on parame- 
ter values  that yield  this result is discussed  in Section  1i1A. 
The  total  inputs  that  can be  utilized  by all available projects  (the 
sum of all three types) is less than the aggregate  endowment  of capital 
goods  each period.  The  storage process is in use at the margin in any 
equilibrium,  and  competition  among  lenders  in  selecting  debt  con- 
tracts implies  that a borrower  can borrow by offering  lenders  a con- 
tract  that  provides  an  expected  return  of  r  per  unit  loaned.  The 
6  Diamond  (1986)  found  that  the  identical  outcomes  are  a sequential  equilibrium 
supported  by  the  belief  that  for  any  interest  rate  offered  in  a  period  there  is  no 
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projects are in economic  scarcity, and any rents they generate  in equi- 
librium will go  to the agents  endowed  with the  projects. 
Consumption  of  each  agent  must be nonnegative  (ct  -  0 for all t). 
This bit of realism is important.  If this assumption  were dropped,  one 
might  never  need  outside  financing;  one  could  simply  consume  a 
negative  amount  in  early  periods  (producing  goods)  and  consume 
positive  amounts  later  (repaying  one's  "borrowed  utility"). Alterna- 
tively, one  could  always issue riskless debt in that case, by producing 
enough  goods  through  negative  consumption  to pay off any claim. In 
addition,  no  stronger  punishment  or  nonpecuniary  penalty  can  be 
imposed  that is more  severe than zero consumption.  This is a form of 
limited liability, ruling out debtors' prisons, physical punishment,  and 
similar phenomena. 
The  equilibrium  concept  used  in this repeated  game of incomplete 
information  is  sequential  Nash  equilibrium,  defined  in  Kreps  and 
Wilson  (1982b).  At  each  stage  and  for  all  possible  actions,  beliefs 
about the implied  type of borrower  are specified  and all actions are a 
best response  to these beliefs and the actions of all other players in the 
game.  In  addition,  beliefs  about  all  equilibrium  actions  are  self- 
fulfilling. 
Review of assumptions.-(1)  There  are four  types of agents:  lenders 
and three  types  of' borrowers.  All agents  are risk neutral.  A borrow- 
er's type is private information.  (2) Inputs are endowed  to each lender 
at the beginning  of each period,  none  to borrowers.  The  endowment 
must be  used  as an input  to storage  or a project during  a period  to 
become  a consumption  good.  Each lender  lives only one  period.  The 
amount  of' each  loan  is one  (dollar),  the  scale of  a borrower's  indi- 
visible project.  (3) There  is no  commitment  technology  for  lenders. 
Borrowers  can commit  to use  the liquidation  technology  conditional 
on some  payments  to lenders  and not to use it given other  payments. 
(4) There  are T time periods;  T is finite, but limiting behavior T  -> o is 
used  for most results.  (5) Projects are in short supply,  and as a result 
the  storage  technology  is  in  use.  Borrowers  can  borrow  with  any 
contract  that  offers  an  expected  return  of' r, the  return  of  storage. 
(6) Project selection  and  outcomes  are private information  observed 
only  by  the  borrower.  Each  borrower's  track record  of' repayment 
or  default  for  all  past  periods  is  observed  by  all  current  lenders. 
(7) Consumption  must  be  nonnegative,  and  nonpecuniary  penalties 
are  not  feasible.  (8)  With  a single-period  horizon,  T  =  1, type  BG 
borrowers  choose  risky projects. 
III.  Borrowing  and  Lending  with  Debt Contracts 
The  contract between  borrowers  and lenders  is assumed  to be a debt 
contract. At the cost of longer  arguments,  debt can be shown to be the REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  835 
optimal contract given the private information  and unobservability of 
project returns  that makes  equity contracts  (where  lenders  receive  a 
share of  realized  returns)  infeasible.  Work on single-period  contract 
design  by Townsend  (1979),  Diamond  (1984),  and Gale and  Hellwig 
(1985)  shows that this unobservability  implies that contracts are opti- 
mally of  the debt  form. 
There  are four  stages each  period.  First borrowers  offer  contracts 
to lenders,  then  lenders  decide  which  loan  contracts  to accept,  then 
borrowers  who get loans choose  their projects, then they observe  the 
return on their projects and decide  how much to pay to lenders  (fac- 
ing liquidation  for some possible payments).  In the sequential equilib- 
rium established  below,  the  face value (one  plus the interest  rate) on 
debt  in a given  period,  rt, is the  same  for  all types.  If r, is such  that 
lenders  get an expected  return below r, given the proportion  of types 
in a period,  the contract is rejected in the second  stage. If rt provides 
an expected  return of at least r, it is accepted.  A debt contract at date t 
is parameterized  by rt and involves commitment  to liquidation  for all 
payments  less than rt. It will turn out that all borrowers who can pay rt 
or more  will pay rt, and all others  will be liquidated.  Although  rt is a 
face value of a loan of one  dollar, at times rt will be referred  to as the 
"interest rate," and parameters  that result in higher or lower interest 
rates  will be  discussed.  This  will not  lead  to  ambiguity  because  the 
interest rate on a loan is rt -  1,  a one-to-one  function of the face value. 
A.  One-Period  Horizon: T  =  1 (or the Final Period if 
T>  1) 
This is the case that has been analyzed previously in Fama and Miller 
(1972)  and Jensen  and Meckling  (1976).  The  one-period  model  here 
is different  because  of  the  imperfect  information  about  borrowers, 
and it is similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  This is a necessary input 
to  the  multiple-period  model  because  at the  final period  there  will 
remain just  one  period. 
Project outcomes  are unobservable  to lenders and cannot be used to 
directly  specify  debt  repayments.  Use  of  the  liquidation  technology 
can provide  incentives  for repayment  by specifying  a face value rT for 
each loan of one unit, such that there is liquidation if less is repaid and 
liquidation  is avoided  if at least rT is paid. Because liquidation  implies 
the  destruction  of  all  output  from  the  project,  it also  implies  zero 
consumption  by  a  borrower.  If  a  project  returns  more  than  rT, a 
borrower  can  repay  rT and  consume  the  remainder  of  the  project's 
return.  No  borrower  would  ever  pay less than  face value  (and con- 
sume  zero) if he could  pay face value  (and consume  the excess of his 
project's return  over the face value of debt). No borrower would pay 
more than rT because  this reduces  the borrower's consumption  (com- 836  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
pared  to  paying  rT) and  has  no  other  benefit  since  liquidation  is 
avoided  by paying  rT.  This  implies  that borrowers  with  projects  re- 
turning rT or more pay rT, and all others are liquidated.  In addition,  if' 
loans  are  made,  rT  must  be  less  than  or  equal  to  G, the  maximum 
amount  that  type  G borrowers  can  pay.  A  higher  rT would  lead  to 
liquidation  for  all borrowers  with  projects  with an  expected  return 
greater  than  the opportunity  cost r,  implying  that lenders  would  not 
lend. 
The  choice of project by type BG's facing a given face value of debt 
rT  needs  to  be  analyzed  to  determine  the  equilibrium  value  of  rT. 
Facing  an  exogenous  face  value  rT  implies  that  if  BG's choose  safe 
projects, their  expected  utility at the  end  of the  period  is G  -  rT.  If 
they choose risky projects, the expected utility is H(B  -  rT).7  The 
optimal  selection  is the one  with the larger expected  utility, implying 
that safe projects are best if and only  if rT '  (G  -  HB)/(l  -  H), and 
risky projects are best if and only if the reverse inequality holds. This 
means that the level of interest rates can influence  the optimal choice. 
Lower values of rT improve  the  relative position  of safe projects (be- 
cause interest costs are paid only with probability 1I with a risky proj- 
ect, but with certainty  with a safe  project).  Figure  1 plots  the begin- 
ning-of-period  values,  d(G  -  rT)  and dH(B  -  rT),  as functions  of rT. 
The  equilibrium  face  value  rT is set such  that risk-neutral  lenders 
receive an expected  return of at least r,  the riskless return on storage. 
The  face value  that will deliver  an expected  return  of  r  depends  on 
the investment  decision  that the type  BG's are expected  to make be- 
cause more loans default  if they select risky projects. Let rVK  denote  the 
face  value  that  makes  a lender's  expected  return  equal  to  r  if type 
BG's are  assumed  to  select  safe  projects,  and r4 the  face  value  that 
provides  that  expected  return  if  BG's  are  assumed  to  select  risky 
projects. If safe projects are selected,  then  only type B's default,  and 
this implies  that r4 is given  by r49  =  r(fBHIB  +  fB;,  +  A;)-  1 because 
type  B's  repay  with  probability  HB,  all  type  G's and  BG's will  re- 
pay, and the probability  of repayment is thenfBHB  +  fB(;  +  fi,.  If 
risky  projects  are  selected  by  all  type  BG's,  then  the  face  value 
rT is given  by r  =  V(fBHB  +  fBCH  +  fc,) 
The  rate  offered  by  borrowers  depends  on  the  policy  that  they 
anticipate lenders  use to grant loans. The  following  policy is an equi- 
librium,  supported  by lenders'  belief's specified  below.  If r  '  (G  - 
nB)/(l  -  n),  then  make  loans  if VT  E  [r4T,  G].  If rg4  ?  (G  -  nB)/(l  - 
H) (so it is not self-fulfilling  for lenders  to believe that BG's will select 
safe projects at 4),  make loans if rT E [4, G]: in this case if 4 exceeds 
7 Beginning-of-period  expected  utility is obtained  by multiplying  each end-of-period 
expected  utility by d <  1. REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  837 
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G, no loans are made.  In any case, if 4>  G, no loans are made. Given 
this policy, all borrowers  offer  the lowest interest rate that lenders will 
accept. Lenders' belief  about borrower type as a function  of the inter- 
est  rate,  rT, offered  is  that  for  all  feasible  rates,  the  type  is  not  a 
function  of the rate. This  is self-fulfilling  because  given it all borrow- 
ers offer  the lowest  rate that will lead to a loan: rg is the equilibrium 
rate if it offers  lenders  an expected  return of r.8 The  equilibrium  rate 
in  the  final  period  is the  lowest  one  that  gives  lenders  an  expected 
return  of  exactly  r. 
To  focus on the role of a long  horizon  (as distinct from just  imper- 
fect  information),  we  assume  that  the  risky projects  are  sufficiently 
close to being  profitable (have expected  values FB  <  r, but not close to 
8 This  belief-that  the  implication  of  any  rate  offered  is  the  pool  of  all current 
borrowers-satisfies  various refinements  of sequential  Nash equilibrium  (e.g., the Cho- 
Kreps [1987]  intuitive  criterion  that disallows  inferences  from off-equilibrium  actions 
that imply belief  that some  type took an action dominated  by the proposed  equilibrium 
payoff). This is true because all types prefer lower interest rates, and the only types that 
want to distinguish  themselves  are the type G's, who never default and therefore  face a 
cost of  higher  rates that  is weakly  higher  than  the  cost  for  other  types.  There  is no 
consistent  interpretation  of a deviation  from all types offering  the same rate, and this is 
true in any sequential  equilibrium.  This also implies that the pooling  on the lowest rate 
is the  unique  equilibrium  that satisfies the  definition  in Grossman  and  Perry (1986). 838  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
zero), such that even if financed at the lowest possible rate (the riskless 
interest  rate  r),  the  optimal  one-period  choice  for  a  type  BG  is to 
choose  risky projects. That  is, we know rT ?  r and we assume 
>G-HB  r 
1-HII.  (1) 
Thus  for all values  offB,fBG,  andfG for which the market does not fail, 
the type BG borrowers will select risky projects and the interest rate rT 
will prevail if there is a one-period  horizon. The  market is open at T if 
and only if rb <  G or, equivalentlyfG>  [(r/G) -  (LffBG  +  JIBfB)l  >  0. 
One  interpretation  of  this  condition  is that only  a borrower  with a 
track record that implies a strictly positive probability of being of type 
G  will  have  a  chance  of  borrowing  at  the  final  date  T.  Lemma  1 
summarizes  the results about a one-period  horizon. 
LEMMA  1. At  the  final  period,  T, (a) all borrowers  offer  the  debt 
contract with the lowest interest rate that provides an expected  return 
of r; (b) all borrowers  who  can repay their debt do  so, and all others 
default;  and  (c) only those  borrowers  with track records  that imply a 
sufficiently  high  (and strictly positive)  probability of being  of  type G 
are able to borrow. 
B.  Lending and Repayment  Decisions with Multiple 
Periods 
The  three  properties  of  equilibrium  at T in lemma  1 turn out  to be 
properties  of  equilibrium  at all previous  dates.  The  stage  that is of 
most  interest  in  this  study  is  the  decision  of  borrowers  about  the 
choice  of  project.  To  focus  on  that decision,  the policies  followed  at 
the  other  stages  are briefly  studied  first, and  analysis of  the  project 
selection  decision  is deferred  to Section IV. Let us begin with the final 
strategic stage in a period:  the decision  of borrowers on how much to 
repay.  This  can  be  studied  without  a  full  analysis  of  the  previous 
stages  by  establishing  two  useful  properties  of  the  second  stage  in 
which  lenders  decide  whether  to grant credit in a period.  Given the 
characterization  of the final (repayment)  stage and the two properties 
of the second  (loan-granting)  stage, Section IIIC shows that at the first 
stage  all borrowers  offer  the  lowest  possible  interest  rate,  as in the 
one-period  analysis. 
Lenders  observe  the  previous  default  record  of  each  borrower. 
Borrowers  face lenders  who live for a single period, but lenders know 
that borrowers  will want  to continue  borrowing  in the  future.  Both 
take these  anticipated  future  actions into account. One implication of 
this forecast  of  future  actions  is that lenders  will not lend  to a bor- 
rower unless  they think there  is some chance that he is of type G. We 
saw that no  one  would  lend  at T unless  there  was a strictly positive REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  839 
probability that a borrower was of type G. No one known to be of type 
B would  receive  a loan because  a type B's project has a total expected 
return below r. No one  would  lend  to a known type BG by a familiar 
argument  using  backward  induction:  no one  would  lend  in the final 
period  (because  risky projects with expected  return below r would be 
selected),  and  successively  earlier  periods  become  the  "last" borrow- 
ing  opportunity,  implying  that  no  one  would  ever  lend.  This  estab- 
lishes the  following  lemma. 
LEMMA  2. If a borrower  is revealed at time t to be of either type B or 
type BG, no one  will lend  to him thereafter. 
This cutoff  of credit to those known not to be of type G requires no 
commitment  by lenders;  such lending  is simply  unprofitable. 
Lemma 3 states a property of the face value of any loan that lenders 
would  accept.  It  follows  from  the  requirement  that  lenders  get  an 
expected  return  of  at least r per dollar  lent. 
LEMMA  3. If a loan is made  at date t, then the face value rt C [r,  G]. 
Proof. If  r,  <  r, then  even  if  repaid  with  certainty,  it  provides  a 
return below r. If r, >  G, then all borrowers  with projects returning  G 
default  and  are  liquidated.  All  other  borrowers  have  projects  with 
expected  returns  below  r,  implying  that  lenders  would  get  an  ex- 
pected  return  below  r. Q.E.D. 
These  properties  of  the  loan-granting  stage  are almost  enough  to 
characterize  the  repayment  policy of  borrowers.  Lemma  4 states the 
equilibrium  repayment  each  period  by each  type of borrower. 
LEMMA  4.  Borrowers  repay  face  value  rt (and  avoid  liquidation)  if 
their  project  returns  at least r,  and  borrowers  with projects that re- 
turn less than rt are liquidated. 
Proof.  See  the Appendix. 
The  proof  of  the  optimal  repayment  policy  is almost  the  same  as 
that in the one-period  case. Suppose  that credit is cut off  on a single 
default.  Then  all borrowers  who could  avoid default  and liquidation 
would  do  so, and  because  all situations  in which there  is not default 
are  indistinguishable,  no  borrower  would  pay  more  than  the  mini- 
mum  necessary  to avoid  default.  Given  that  repayment  policy,  only 
those  who  cannot  repay  rt C  [r,  G] default,  and  such borrowers  are 
not of type G. A default  then  does  indeed  cut off  credit, by lemma  2, 
and the beliefs  about the implications  of a default  are self-fulfilling.9' 
9  The  belief' that those who have def'aulteci are those who were constrained  to default 
and  that  those  who  did  not  are  the  pool  of' all who  could  avoid  default  satisfies  the 
refinements  to equilibrium  mentioned  in n. 8. This  is because default  is feasible f'or all 
types and has the lowest cost f'or the types who must default,  implying  that it is not self- 
f'ulfilling to  believe  that  defatilt  conveys  news  that  default  could  have  been  avoided. 
There  can be no future  favorable inference  from current default,  and there is a current 
benefit from avoiding  liquidation,  so all who can do so avoid default.  This is the unique 
self-fulfilling  belief' about repayment  and default  of' a loan actually granted  in the past. 840  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
An immediate  consequence  of this lemma is a rule that lenders  use 
in deciding  if a loan  should  be made.  This  is lemma  5. 
LEMMA  5. Any default  (payment  of less than rt) by a borrower  at a 
date t leads  to no lending  for all future  dates. 
Because  default  will reveal  that a borrower  is not of type G, it will 
influence  his  future  treatment  by  lenders:  no  more  credit  will  be 
advanced.'0  This learning  from observed  behavior is key to the incen- 
tive value  of  reputation.  One  might  actively avoid default  (by choos- 
ing  safe  projects) to avoid  the premature  cutoff  of one's credit, even 
though  one  will later choose  risky projects  (e.g.,  in the final period). 
This  incentive  effect  is analyzed  in Section  IV. 
C.  Rates Offered at the Beginning of Each Period 
Borrowers  who can repay and avoid liquidation will pay the minimum 
payment  that avoids  liquidation:  this payment  is rt. This  first stage is 
for borrowers to offer  the debt contracts, and this is a choice of rt. We 
saw in  Section  IIIA  that  in  the  final  period  all borrowers  offer  the 
lowest  rate that provides  lenders  with an expected  return  of  r. Bor- 
rowers  offer  the  lowest  possible  rate in all periods.  The  supporting 
beliefs  and  actions  of  lenders  are  that they  believe  that the  rate of- 
fered  at T -  1 reveals nothing  new about a borrower's type, and they 
will lend at the lowest rate that gives an expected  return of r given the 
belief  that  each  borrower  is  a  random  draw  from  the  pool  of  all 
borrowers  who  have  not  yet defaulted.  Under  this belief  there  is no 
current  benefit  from  offering  a higher  than  needed  rate. The  only 
possible motivation  for such a higher  current rate is a possible future 
benefit:  for example,  a borrower's attempt to signal his type by offer- 
ing a higher  than needed  interest  rate. If any borrower deviated  and 
offered  a rate higher  than the minimum,  he would be indistinguish- 
able in the future  from  those  who offered  the lower rate and would 
achieve  no future  benefit."  This  implies  that all borrowers  pool and 
offer  the lowest rate that provides  lenders  with an expected  return of 
10 It is not  essential  to  our  basic approach  that credit  be  cut  off.  A  similar  effect 
occurs in a version of this model in which all projects have positive net present value but 
safe  projects  have  higher  net  present  value.  This  implies  that the  best response  to a 
default  is an increase  in the  interest  rate. 
1  l One  more  general  implication  of lemma  1 is that contract choice cannot  separate 
the various  types of  borrowers,  no matter  how  the beliefs  are specified.  Any contract 
that only a type other than G would offer  would lead to no lending  now or in the future 
and zero consumption  for the borrower  offering  the contract. A contract that specifies 
a payment  feasible  for type G's (who can pay at most G) would allow the other  types to 
have  positive  expected  consumption,  dominating  the  zero consumption  implied  by a 
separating  contract  that would  be offered  only by a type other  than G. REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  841 
r at T-  1. The  argument  extends  recursively to all previous  t <  T.12 
We have  established  the following  lemma. 
LEMMA  6.  At  all dates  all borrowers  offer  the  lowest  interest  rate 
that provides  lenders  with an expected  return  of r. 
Within  each  period  we  have  established  some  properties  of  a se- 
quential  equilibrium  in which  the  interest  rate offered  at the begin- 
ning correctly takes into account a part of the rule that lenders  use to 
grant  loans  and  the  rule  that each borrower  will use to repay at the 
end  of  each  period.  Given  these  properties,  the  project decisions  of 
type BG borrowers  can be analyzed.  Only given  that analysis can the 
"lowest interest  rate that provides  lenders  with an expected  return of 
r" in lemma  6 be precisely  defined.  Section  IV provides  this analysis 
for  given  interest  rates  and  an  analysis  of  interest  rates  for  given 
project decisions. 
IV.  Project  Choice  and  Interest  Rates 
A.  Project Decisions  for Given Interest  Rates 
At the final period,  type BG borrowers  will select risky projects. The 
T  -  1 present  value  of  continuing  to borrow  until period  T (by not 
defaulting  at T  -  1 because  a default  cuts off  credit by lemma  5) is 
thus  the  value  of  choosing  a risky project.  Let Vt be the  maximized 
value as of t of making optimal  project decisions  from t to T. At T this 
is given  by VT  =  dH(B  -  rT). 
Define  Vb  and  Vf to be the value as of t of choosing,  respectively,  a 
risky and a safe project at t and making optimal decisions  thereafter. 
Clearly, Vt =  max{Vtb,  Vi}, where Vbt  =  dH(B  -  rt +  Vt?  ,)  and Vf = 
d(G  -  rt +  Vt+ 1). A type  BG borrower  chooses  safe  projects if and 
only if VT  -  Vbt0  or d{G -  HB -  [(1 -  H)(rt -  V, ?)]}?  'O ,implying 
rt -  V,  1 <  (G  -  HB)/(1 -  H). If and only if this condition holds, Vt 
=  Vf, and this is then equivalent  to Vt ?  d{G -  [(G -  HB)/(1  -  rl]}. 
This  establishes  lemma  7. 
LEMMA  7. Safe projects are the optimal choice at date t if and only if 
rt -  Vt+I  <  (G  -  HB)/(1 -  H) or, equivalently,  Vt ?  d{G -  [(G - 
12 The  belief  that  the  rate  offered  reveals  nothing  new  about  type  satisfies  the 
refinements  mentioned  in n. 8, and pooling  of rates at this rate is the only outcome  that 
fulfills the equilibrium  defined  in Grossman and Perry (1986).  The  reason is the same 
as at the final period  T: offering  rates above the minimum  needed  has no differentially 
lower cost for type G (the only type that would want to differentiate  itself), and the new 
wrinkle  is  that  in  later  periods  those  who  offer  rates  deviating  from  the  proposed 
equilibrium  rates are treated  identically  to those  who offer  the proposed  equilibrium 
rates. Therefore,  there is no consistent  interpretation  of a deviation from the proposed 
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HIB)/(  1 -  H)]}. Risky projects are the optimal choice if and only if the 
reverse  inequalities  hold. 
The  implication  of  lemma  7 is that repaying  a loan has the short- 
run cost of rt and the long-run  benefit of V,+ 1, and the term rt -  Vt+  + 
plays an identical  role to rt in the single-period  case because a default 
cuts off a borrower's credit.  Figure 2 shows Vb and Vf as a function  of 
rt -  V,+  .  Risky projects  are  selected  when  rt -  V 1+I is high.  The 
optimality  of  risky projects  also  implies  that  V, is low,  so type  BG's 
always  prefer  to  have  reason  to  select  the  safe  project.  When  type 
BG's are  indifferent  between  safe  and  risky projects,  V, =  d{G  - 
[(G  -  IIB)/(1  -  HI)]}.  Further  results  on  periods  of  indifference  by 
type  BG's are presented  below  in lemmas  11 and  12. 
Reducing  the interest rate charged  to a borrower at any date makes 
safe projects become  relatively more attractive on that date. Reduced 
interest  rates  at date  t also  increase  Vtb  and  Vf, implying  that  Vt = 
max{Vtb,  Vf} is increased.  This  makes safe  projects more  attractive at 
t -  1. By a similar argument,  V,  1 is increasing in Vt, implying  that a 
reduction  in  rt increases  Vt-  i,  which  makes  safe  projects  relatively 
more  attractive  on  date  t  -  2  and,  by  recursion,  on  all  dates  be- 
fore t. 
The  most favorable situation  for the selection of safe projects is one 
in which  "interest rates" are at their minimum  possible value, rt =  r. 
This  provides  a  necessary  condition  for  reputation  effects  to  have REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  843 
value and induce  type BG's to select safe projects on some date. It will 
later  be  shown  to  be  a  sufficient  condition  when  T  ->  oo. This  is a 
necessary  condition  for there  to exist a date t on which Vf 2  Vb. 
LEMMA  8. Type  BG borrowers will select safe projects on some date 
only if d(G -  r)/(l  -  d) >  dH(B -  r)/(l  -  dH), implying that the 
present value of financing  the safe project at the riskless rate of inter- 
est  for  an  infinite  number  of  periods  exceeds  the  present  value  of 
selecting  the risky project for an infinite number  of periods  (until the 
first default). 
Proof. From (1), risky projects are optimal at T. From lemma 7, safe 
projects are best if and only if rt  -  Vt_  I <  (G -  HB)/(1  -  H). Because 
risky projects  are selected  at T and  if safe projects are ever optimal, 
there will be a date t when safe projects are selected,  followed  by risky 
ones  until  T. On such a date  t, we know 
(dHf)  (B  -  r) 
T 
Vj, 
1  <  K  =  lim  i  (B  -  r)(dl)t 
1  - aii  T-*c  t- 
because this is the upper bound on the value of selecting risky projects 
until  the  first default  for  an infinite  number  of  periods,  and  rt 2  r. 
Thus  safe  project optimality  at t requires 
d[G  -  r  +  dH(B  -  r)]  _  dHB  -  r  +  dH(B  -r) 
or 
(dH)(B -  r)  G-  HB 
1-dH  1  -  I 
Rearranging  terms  produces  the  following  equivalent  conditions 
that are necessary  for reputation  to ever have value: 
dH(B  -  r)  >r  -  G-  HB  (2) 
d(G -r)  >  dH(B -  r)  (3) 
1-  d  1 - dH 
and 
dH(B -G)  >  r  G -HB  (4) 
1 -H  1-H. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 8 makes sense because the loss of reputation  from a default 
at worst results in a cutoff  of credit, and if the rents on the safe project 
are  low  enough  that  they  are  exceeded  by those  of  choosing  risky 844  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
projects at the low rate r (and conditions  [2]-[4]  fail), loss of reputa- 
tion is not  a potent  enough  weapon  to induce  cooperative  behavior. 
This condition  is also sufficient  if T -o,  but proof of this is deferred 
to Section  V. 
Lemma  9  provides  a sufficient  condition  for  the  selection  of  safe 
projects at a date if the horizon  is long.  It states that if future interest 
rates  are  below  a  given  level  at  all  dates  in  the  future,  then  safe 
projects are currently  optimal.  This  level of future  interest  rates will 
specify  feasible  future  rates (i.e.,  rates greater than the riskless rate) 
only  if conditions  in lemma  8 hold. 
LEMMA  9. If, for all t E [I,  T], rt <  dG +  (1  -  d)(G  -  HB)I(1 -  H), 
then  there  exists T <  oc such that safe projects are the optimal choice 
at date t: T such that ri -  Vi+ I ?  (G -  HB)/(1 -  H). This bound on 
future  interest  rates specifies  feasible  rates-that  is, dG +  (1  -  d)(G 
-  HB )/(1  -  H) >  r-if  and only if the necessary conditions  (in lemma 
8) for reputation  to have value  are true. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The  conditions  for  safe  projects  to  be  selected  at  some  date  in 
lemmas  8 and 9 are stated in terms of interest rates, which are endog- 
enous.  The  next  subsection  describes  equilibrium  interest  rates  for 
given project decisions.  Section V uses these results to provide general 
necessary and sufficient conditions  for reputation  effects  to be strong 
enough  on some  date to imply the selection  of safe projects on some 
date.  The  remainder  of  the  characterization  in  the  general  case  is 
deferred  to Section  VII. 
B.  Interest  Rates  for Given Project  Decisions 
For  any  equilibrium  there  is  a  range  that  bounds  the  equilibrium 
interest  rate (face value),  rt. The  lowest value that it can attain is the 
value that provides  a normal expected  return, r, to lenders  under the 
assumption  that  type  BG borrowers  choose  safe  projects.  As in our 
discussion  in  Section  IIIA,  we  call this rate 4f. The  largest  possible 
value  of  the  interest  rate  is rb, the  one  that  gives  lenders  a normal 
expected  return  if all type BG's choose  risky projects. At t =  1, these 
rates are given  by 
rg =  r 
r1  fG  +  fBG  +  HBfB 
and 
b  r 
fG  +  (HfBG)  +  (HBfB) REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  845 
The  bounds  on  the  rates  in  periods  after  t  =  1 depend  on  the 
population  of borrowers with a given track record. Because those who 
default  are  denied  future  credit,  all those  who  continue  to borrow 
have  perfect  records  of  no  default.  Define fet  as the  fraction  of  the 
original  pool  of  all borrowers  who  are  of  type  0  and  have  not  yet 
defaulted by the beginning  of period t. For example,fBl  =  fB.  Because 
type B borrowers always select risky projects,fBt  =  Ht-  'fB113  Type  G 
borrowers  always select safe projects, implyingfGt  = fG for all t. The 
fraction  of type BG borrowers  in the pool of those with a reputation 
of  no  default  depends  on  the  decisions  made  each  period:  if  safe 
projects are selected  at date t  -  1  by all BG's, thenfBGt  =  fBGt-  1. If all 
BG's select risky projects at t  -  1, thenfBG,  =  HlfBGt-  1. At date t, the 
pool of borrowers  is a fractionfG  +  fBt  +  fBGt  of  the original pool of 
borrowers,  and out of the original pool, the fraction of loans repaid at 
t  is fG  +  (H1BfBt)  +  (flfBGt).  The  bounds  on  r, at date  t  that  give 
lenders  an expected  return  of r are therefore  given by 
?f  =  r  fG  +  fBGt  + 
fBit 




fG  +  fBGt  + 
JfBt  t 
fG  +  (flfBGt)  +  (flBfBt) 
Note  that  iffBG  =  0, then rt =  rK.  In the case  offBG  =  0 the interest 
rates can be specified  without  knowing  the equilibrium  actions of the 
finite number  of  type  BG's (because  there  are an infinite  number  of 
borrowers). 
Characterization  of the choice between rK  and rt for all t is presented 
in  Section  V.  This  choice  is first analyzed  for  the  periods  near  the 
horizon,  T. 
V.  The  Endgame:  Analysis  of  Decisions  near the 
Horizon,  T 
Lemmas  8  and  9  provide  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions,  in 
terms of interest rates, for the selection of safe projects at some date if 
T ->  oo.  This section extends  these to conditions  in terms of exogenous 
parameters. 
Define  the "endgame" as the period  until T that begins when a type 
13  I use a version of the law of large numbers here by equating the fraction of type B's 
who  actually repay  with  its expected  value.  This  can be made  rigorous  (see  Feldman 
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FIG. 3.-Face  values,  rt, given  no default  up to date t. It is assumed  thatfB  >  0 and 
fBG  =  0. 
BG  switches  to  (or  back  to)  risky  projects.  Formally,  the  endgame 
begins on date T, where v is the smallest t with Vf ?  Vb that occurs after 
some date t where V?  >  Vib.  If no date t exists, then Vf ?  Vb  for all t, and 
we define  the endgame  as the entire  game  from t =  1 to t =  T. 
The  endgame  is bounded  if there  exists K <  oo  such  that T  -  T  < 
K as T ->  oo. A bounded  endgame  implies  that T  -->  o  as  T -  oo. 
A.  A Low Fraction of Type  BG's 
To  develop  the basic points about the endgame,  consider  the case in 
which, of the infinite number of borrowers, a fractionfB are of type B, 
a fraction fG  =  1 -  fB  of type G, and a finite number  (representing  a 
zero  fraction)  of borrowers  are of  type BG. The  series of  the lowest 
interest  rate that provides  lenders  an expected  return of r (given the 
current  population  of borrowers  with a given  track record) is exoge- 
nous, and 4f =  rb.  By lemma 6, the face value series, rt, is given by (and 
shown  in fig. 3) 
rt  =  H  fB  +  1  fB  (5)  r 
BrHfB?1-fB(5 
Provided that r1 c  G, (5) states the interest rate charged over time to 
those  who  do  not  default  up  to  time  t. All  those  who  default  are 
revealed  to be types  other  than  G and  thus have their credit cut off 
from  that point  forward.  If r,  >  G, then  the capital market fails and 
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Note  that r, strictly falls over  time  and converges  to r (the riskless 
rate) as t --  oo. This  occurs  because  the class of borrowers  who have 
not yet defaulted  contains  a decreasing  proportion  of borrowers with 
risky projects  (and fBt  -O  0 as t --> o).  The  decision  facing  the finite 
number  of  type BG borrowers  is to choose  between  the two projects 
available  to  them  given  the  anticipated  time  path  of  interest  rates 
available to them  specified  in (5). 
Because  rt --  r as t --  oo, if  the  horizon  T --  oc, there  will be an 
arbitrarily large number  of periods  in which, for all E >  0, rt <  r +  e. 
Lemma  9 then  implies  that the necessary conditions  for the selection 
of  safe  projects  on  some  t  (e.g.,  condition  [2])  are  necessary  and 
sufficient  for  the  selection  of  safe  projects at some  date and  for the 
endgame  to have bounded  length  as T --  oc. This  is lemma  10. 
LEMMA  10.  If  fBG  =  0,  then  the  necessary  conditions  stated  in 
lemma  8 for selection  of safe projects on some  t as T -s  oo  are neces- 
sary and  sufficient  for a bounded  endgame  as T ->  oo. 
This  result can be directly extended  to fBG  >  0, but not too large. 
On any date, rt ?  rbt.  Suppose  thatfBG is low enough  so that iffBt  =  0, 
then r$t<  dG +  (1  -  d)(G  - HB)/(1  - H).  As t  -oo,fBt  -0,  implying 
that there is a t <  oo  such that rb <  dG +  (1  -  d)(G -  HB)/(1  -  H). If 
the horizon  T --  oo, then an immediate  application of lemma 9 implies 
that  the  conditions  in  lemma  8  are  necessary  and  sufficient  for  a 
bounded  length  endgame  iffBG is not too large. 
If fBG  is  large,  implying  that rb might  exceed  dG +  (1  -  d)(G  - 
HB)/(1  -  H) even  with a low fBt, the direct application of lemma 9 to 
an upper  bound  on  future  interest  rates cannot  be made.  The  next 
subsection  analyzes  the case of  largefBG. 
B.  A Bounded  Endgame  as T -o  when  fBG  >  0 
To  establish  that  (2)  and  r,  '  G are  necessary  and  sufficient  for  a 
bounded  length  endgame  (i.e.,  v  -->  oo  as T --  oc), we proceed  in two 
steps.  First,  an  interest  rate  path  rt, that  provides  lenders  with  an 
expected  return  of  r each  period  and  yields  a bounded  length  end- 
game is established.  Then  it is shown that borrowers will offer interest 
rates that result in a bounded  length  endgame. 
When fBG  >  0,  the  possible  increase  in interest  rates on  a date  v 
when a switch is made to risky projects implies that there may need  to 
be  some  periods  in  which  some  type  BG's select  safe  projects  and 
others select risky projects. The  interest rate rb  that prevails if all BG's 
select risky projects could  be too high iffBc,,  the fraction of the origi- 
nal pool of borrowers who are of type BG and who have not defaulted 
by date 7, is too high.  For example,  rb  could exceed  G (and be inconsis- 
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enough  to  imply  such  a  low  VT that  it  would  be  inconsistent  with 
selection  of  safe  projects  at v  -  1. In either  case a period  of  time is 
needed  in which some  type BG's select safe projects and others select 
risky projects.  This  would  require  that  they  be indifferent  between 
the two projects on  those  dates. 
IffBG  is large, rb  might exceed  the level specified in lemma 9, even if 
fBt  =  0. The  following  lemmas  show that a bounded  period of mixed 
strategy  project selection  will allow fBGt  to be reduced  sufficiently  to 
guarantee  that  after  the  mixed  strategy  period,  r$b  c  dG  +  (1  - 
d)(G  -  HB)/(1  -  H), allowing  application  of lemma 9 and the result 
that the period  after  the mixed  strategy period  is bounded.  In addi- 
tion we show that directly before  the mixed strategy period, type BG's 
select  safe  projects in pure  strategy. 
A period  of mixed  strategy indifference  obviously requires that on 
all dates of it, including  the final date of indifference,  BG's be willing 
to  select  safe  projects.  Lemma  11 gives  a bound  on  V,+I  that is re- 
quired  for indifference  at t. At some  period  t =  t' after an indiffer- 
ence  period,  risky projects  will be  selected  in pure  strategy  (e.g.,  at 
t =  T), and the interest  rates r$,'  will prevail. At any date t', we know 
that r, <  rb, for t >  t'. Lemmas  12 and  13 show that a bounded  period 
of mixed  strategy before  t' can reducefBGt'  sufficiently  to allow rt, to 
be less than or equal to the level (given in lemma  9) that implies  that 
safe  projects will be selected  at t'. The  result, proposition  1, is that if 
the  market does  not  fail, then  the necessary  conditions  (in lemma  8) 
for  reputation  to  have  value  are  necessary  and  sufficient  for  a 
bounded  length  endgame. 
LEMMA  11. There  exists  an interest  rate rt E  [r,  G], such that type 
BG's are indifferent  between  safe and risky projects, implying Vf =  t 
if and only if Vt+  1 E [L, H], where L _ r-[(G  -  HB)/(1  -  H)] and H 
_G  -  [(G-  HB)/(1  -  H)]. 
Proof.  VT =  Vb implies (by lemma 7) Vt+ 1  =  rt-  [(G  -  HB)/(1  -  H)], 
and replacing  rt by r and by G provides  the bounds L and H. Q.E.D. 
Lemma  11 implies that if Vt E  [L, H], indifference  between projects 
is feasible (as is strict preference  for either type of project in the open 
interval (L, H)) as long as fBt is low enough  to allow a low 4f  andfBGt  is 
not too low for an 4f  sufficiently  above r. Lemma 12 provides a charac- 
terization of repeated  periods  of mixed strategy indifference  between 
projects. 
LEMMA  12. If  Vf  =  Vb, with rt E  [r, G], implying  indifference  be- 
tween  safe and risky projects at t, then 
(a)  Vt  =  d{G  -  [(G  -  HB)/(1  -  Hl)]}; 
(b)  Vt  E  [L,  H];  and 
(c) there  exists rt-  1  E  [r,  G] such that Vt  1 =  Vb- 1 and rt-  1 =  dG + 
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Proof. Vf  =  Vb implies,  by lemma  7, 
Vt =  d(G -  G-HB)  =  dH < Hy 
Vt  =  dG  -  HB)  =  H  [dH(B  -  G)]  >  L 
by (4). By lemma  11, Vt E (L, H) implies that there exists rt1  E  (r, G) 
with Vg_  l=  Vt_  and substitution  of Vt  into rt- I  =  Vt +  [(G-I1B)/(1 
-  I)]  produces r,  I  =  dG +  (1 -  d)(G -  rIB)/(1  -  H). Q.E.D. 
Lemma  12  shows  that  repeated  periods  of  mixed  strategy  indif- 
ference  are possible  as long  as fBt  and fBGt are such that rt  =  dG + 
(1 -  d)(G  -  HB)/(1  -  H) is feasible,  implying  that rbt  ?  dG +  (1  - 
d)(G -  HB)/(1  -  H) ?f  . Note that the same interest rate, dG +  (1  - 
d)(G  -  HB)/(1  -  H), is also the bound  specified in lemma 9 such that 
if  there  is the  ability to borrow  at future  rates less than the  bound, 
then  a finite  number  of  remaining  periods  before  T guarantees  that 
safe projects are optimal at the current date. A mixed strategy period 
ending at date t' can thus reducefBGt sufficiently  to imply  Vt,  + 1  >  L, to 
use  the  notation  of  lemma  11.  To  support  a  preceding  repeated 
mixed  strategy  period,  lemma  11 implies  that one  needs  Vt, + 1  E  [L, 
H].  Lemma  13 provides  this stronger  result. 
LEMMA 13. If the necessary conditions  for reputation  to have value 
in  lemma  8  are  true,  then  there  exists  a  bounded  mixed  strategy 
period  ending  on  a date  t', such that Vt, E  [L, H). 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The  previous  results  imply  that  there  exists  an interest  rate path 
such that the length  of the endgame  has an upper  bound  as T ->  o: a 
mixed  strategy period  of bounded  length  can guarantee  that thereaf- 
ter rb ?  dG +  (1  -  d)(G  -  HB)/(1  -  H), and there exists a bounded 
length  period  thereafter  that begins  with  Vt E  [L, H);  this supports 
the  mixed  strategy  period.  This  implies  that there  exists  an interest 
rate path that leads  to a bounded  endgame.  The  result of lemma  6, 
that borrowers  offer  the lowest feasible rates each period,  implies the 
stronger  result  that  the  interest  rates actually offered  by borrowers 
imply a bounded  length  endgame.  This  is because at any date before 
the shortest  feasible  endgame,  it is feasible  for all borrowers to offer 
the  interest  rate  4f, and  by lemma  6,  this is the  rate that is offered. 
During  the endgame,  rates above 4f will be offered,  but these are the 
lowest feasible  rates on  those  dates. 
Overall, we have established  the  following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1. If the loan market is active, then the endgame  is of 
bounded  length  as T -*  oo  if and only if (2) is true. 
With this result that the endgame  comprises  a bounded  number  of 
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VI.  The  Dynamics  of  Reputation  with  a Long 
Horizon 
Far enough  from  the horizon,  T, safe projects will be selected  if and 
only  if  (2) holds.  If  (2) is false,  there  is never  an incentive  effect  of 
reputation.  We now focus on the case in which (2) is true and reputa- 
tion  eventually  has value.  To  see  how the incentive  value of  reputa- 
tion  evolves  over time  and develop  intuition  into how it evolves,  two 
special  cases of  the  model  are developed.  The  contrast between  the 
two cases will develop  the relevant  ideas, and Section VII  shows that 
these  intuitive  ideas  are  true  in  the  general  model.  There  are  two 
special cases: (1) near absence of adverse selection  (fB  =  0), with near 
absence  of  moral hazard  (fBG  =  0), and (2) significant adverse selec- 
tion  (fB  >  0), with near  absence  of  moral hazard  (fBG  =  0). 
In both cases,fBG  =  0 is assumed  to allow the simple determination 
of interest rates to ease exposition.  The  two cases illustrate the impor- 
tance of adverse selection  in the dynamics of reputation  by a compari- 
son of fB  =  0 with fB  >  0. 
A.  Near Absence  of Adverse Selection  (fB  =  0), with 
fBG  =  0 
WithfG  =  1 and a finite number  of other  types, (5) shows that rt  =  r 
for all t. At T. risky projects will be selected,  and thus VT =  d  H(B  -  r) 
while  rT  1  -  VT =  r  -  dH(B  -  r).  By lemma  7, safe  projects  are 
selected  at t if and only if r  -  V,+ 1 greater  than (G  -  HIB)/(1 -  H), 
and  for t' sufficiently  near T, 
T 
Vt,  =  E  (B  -  r)df1l1'+t, 
t==t' 
which is a strictly decreasing  function  of t'. On some date t' <  T, safe 
projects will be selected because the sum will exceed  the critical value r 
-  [(G  -  HIB)/(1 -  H)] and will exceed  this value for all t <  t'. This 
implies  that on all dates t <  t' safe projects will be selected  because at 
any date  t' the value  of  continuing  to borrow is at least the value of 
borrowing  and choosing  the risky project each period.  Figure 4 shows 
r  -  Vt+ 1, when  interest  rates are constant  at the riskless rate, r. 
The  implication  of  this  special  case  is that  if there is no significant 
adverse  selection,  so interest  rates  do not change as a function of one's  reputa- 
tion, then reputation works immediately  if it ever works:  safe  projects  are 
selected  at t  =  1 unless  risky projects  are  selected  for  all t. This  is 
consistent  with  the  basic intuition  from  previous  models  of  reputa- 
tions. REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  851 
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FIG.  4.-The  time series of r, -V,  1 assumingfB  =  0. Assuming  thatfB  =  0 implies 
that interest  rates are constant  at the riskless rate, i.e., rt =  r. 
B.  Significant Adverse Selection  (fB  >  0), with 
fBG  =  0 
WithfBG  =  0, rt is given  by (5). For large t, rt ->  r, so if T -x  00,  then 
near  T the  analysis  is  similar  to  the  last subsection,  where  rt  =  r. 
However,  for borrowers  with short track records  (small t), the higher 
rates, rt >  r, have two effects  because  the decision  between  safe and 
risky projects  depends  only  on  rt -  V,+  ,.  Higher  rates  make  safe 
projects  relatively  less attractive for  given  Vte  + I. and  higher  current 
rates reduce  Vi', making  safe  projects less attractive for  t <  t'. This 
implies  that  if  fB  is  high  enough  (initial  interest  rates  are  high 
enough),  then the finite number  of type BG's will select risky projects 
at some  early dates,  even  though  those  who do not default  will later 
select  safe  projects.  In  principle  they  might  switch  back and  forth 
between  the two projects. Proposition  2 provides a characterization of 
the  scope  for  project  switching  assuming  only  that rt falls over  time. 
Under  the  assumption  that fBG  =  0,  (5) shows that r, does  fall over 
time. In Section VII, proposition  2 will be shown to apply withfBG >  0 
if the remaining  time before  the  horizon  is sufficiently  long. 
PROPOSITION  2.  If rt falls over  time  and  a type  BG borrower  opti- 
mally selects safe projects at t + and selects risky projects at some t' < 
t+,  then  risky projects  are optimal  for all t <  t'. This  implies  that if 
safe projects are best on two dates t, and t + (t, <  t  +), then the optimal 
project selection  is safe  projects for all t E  [t1, t+]. 
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FIG. 5.-The  time series of r, -  V,,  1, assumingfB  >  0; fB  >  0 implies  that interest 
rates  fall as a longer  track record  is acquired.  Sufficiently  high fB  implies  that risky 
projects are best at t =  1. 
risky  projects  are  selected.  Safe  projects  are  best  at i  +  1, and  by 
lemma 7, Vi+ I 2  d{G -  [(G -  HB)!(1  -  H)]}.  Because risky projects 
are best at  i,  Vi < d{G -  [(G -  HB)/(1-  H)]}  '  V?+  1, and ri -  Vi+ I > 
(G  -  JIB)/(I  -  H).  Interest rates fall, implying rj  ?  r>- 1, and combined 
with Vi <  V^+  1 we have 
rt^_I-  Vt  >  ri  -  V-  +I 
>G  -HB 
This implies that risky projects are best at I -  1, and because r', ?  r, for 
all t' <  i, recursion  implies that because Vj-  1 < d{G  -  [(G -  HB)I(1  - 
H)]} '  V?+  1, risky projects are best for all t <  t'. Q.E.D. 
Proposition  2  makes  no  use  of  the  length  of  the  time  horizon. 
There  are only two reasons  for choosing  risky projects: a short hori- 
zon or high current interest rates. Because interest rates fall over time 
conditional  on  not defaulting,  the only reason  for switching  to risky 
projects once  rates are low enough  to justify  safe  projects is a short 
horizon.  If there is a date on which safe projects are selected,  then on 
such a date, or any earlier date, a short horizon is not the problem.  If 
risky projects are selected  on such an earlier date, the problem is high 
interest  rates.  If  one  goes  back further  in time,  rates are higher,  so 
risky projects are again best. Figure 5 shows the time path of rt -  Vt  + 1, 
computed  using  the interest  rates in figure  3 (rates that decline  over REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  853 
time). Proposition  2 implies that if rates decline with longer periods of 
lack of default,  then r, -  V,  plotted  as a function  of t can cross the 
threshold  for choice of safe projects, (G -  HR )/(1 -  HI),  at most twice. 
If the rates in the  early periods  are sufficiently  above r because  of  a 
large fraction of type B's (but are less than G), then the optimal choice 
on those dates will be risky projects, again by the reasoning  of lemma 
7. If the horizon  is long,  the reason  is simpler.  If the horizon  is long 
enough,  Vt+  I  '  Vt because  rates  fall  while  the  horizon  is  not 
significantly  reduced  (the  proof  is left to the reader). 
The  result  of  this  example  is  that  when there is significant adverse 
selection (a heterogeneous  pool of borrower  qualities) in  the initial pool of 
borrowers  with no track record, then reputation initially will not deal with 
moral hazard  problems,  but instead a period  of "reputation acquisition" 
will be required.  If the adverse selection is severe enough,  so there are 
high  interest  rates  (from  [5]) in  early  periods  for  those  with  short 
track records and resulting  low V, for low t, reputation  will not work in 
early periods,  and risky projects will be selected  for t =  1, . . . , t until 
rates  fall enough  for  rt -  Vt+I to be less than  (G  -  IB)/(1  -  II). 
Borrowers  without  track records  will select risky projects. Only some 
of those who select risky projects will default,  and the others will get a 
good  reputation.  This will eventually lead to such a good credit rating 
and  such  low  interest  rates  that  type  BG  borrowers  who  have  not 
defaulted  will want to avoid loss of this valuable credit rating and will 
switch to safe projects for an unbounded  number of periods until the 
endgame.  That is, there will be a period of reputation  acquisition, but 
eventually  reputation  will work to provide  incentives.  The  next  sec- 
tion shows  that this result applies  in general,  withfBG >  0, and pro- 
vides a full characterization  of equilibrium. 
VII.  Equilibrium  Path of  Project  Choices  with 
fBG  >  0 
Under  the  assumption  fBG  =  0, characterization  of  equilibrium  for 
any horizon  length  was a matter of computing  the functions  Vb  and Vf 
using  the  interest  rates in  (5). With fBG  >  0,  we need  to determine 
whether  the  appropriate  rate  each  period  is rf or r$t.  The  result  of 
proposition  1, that all borrowers offer  the lowest feasible interest rate, 
suggests  the  following  characterization,  which  is established  below. 
First, try a conjecture  in which,  from  t =  1 until the endgame,  type 
BG's choose  safe projects (and face interest rates rt =  ?f every period 
until the endgame).  If this leads to interest rates that imply the conjec- 
tured behavior by type BG's, it is the equilibrium rate path, by propo- 
sition  1. On the other  hand,  if the interest rate series conditioned  on 
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find risky projects  more  profitable  (because  there  are many type B's 
and  thus  high  rates),  then  the  equilibrium  at t  =  1 involves  their 
selecting  risky projects  (and  paying  higher  rates that reflect this). If 
r, <  G and (2) holds,  eventually  the fraction of type B's who have not 
defaulted  gets low enough,  and BG's will switch to safe projects for an 
unbounded  number  of  periods  (v  -->  o as T --  oc). If  (2) is false and 
r,  <  G so the  market  does  not  fail, then  reputation  never  has value 
and  BG's select risky projects every period. 
Consider  more  precisely  the case in which markets do not fail and 
the  necessary  conditions  for  reputation  to  have  value  (e.g.,  [2]) are 
true.  If T --> o,  then  both t and  T  -  t can be made  arbitrarily large. 
On such a date, t*, proposition  1 states that safe projects are best and 
rt* =  4f*. Because  safe projects are best at t*, by lemma 7, V,* -  d{G - 
[(G -  RIB)/(l -  [I)]}. Note  that if is a strictly decreasing  function  of t 
becausefBt  is strictly decreasing  in t. When one moves back in time, if 
4f  gets sufficiently high that risky projects are best at some date t  ', then 
on that date rt' =  rt.  In addition,  at any date t <  t', rt '  rS,+1, so safe 
projects will not be selected  at t <  t'. This  implies  that interest  rates 
fall over time until the endgame  and that the result of proposition  2 
applies:  if  T -o  and  one  considers  dates  away from  the  bounded 
endgame,  then if safe projects are selected at t* and risky projects at t' 
<  t*, then  risky projects are selected  for all t '  t'. 
To  actually compute  the values  Vt, values for ?f and rtb  are needed, 
and  these  depend  on  decisions  by type  BG's at earlier  periods.  Be- 
cause proposition  2 applies,  the only information  needed  to calculate 
these  interest  rates is the single date I  near t =  1, where  BG's switch 
from  risky to safe  projects.  Define  the face value Rf[t]  to be the one 
that gives lenders  an expected  return of r at date t if BG's choose  safe 
projects  at t, and  the  projects  selected  for  dates less than t are risky 
projects from dates  I to t -  1 and safe projects for t E  [4, t -  1] (if t < 
t  -  1, obviously  there  are no  past dates on which safe projects were 
selected).  The  term R$b[t] is the  face value that provides  an expected 
return  of r if risky projects are selected  at t, and the projects selected 
at dates  less than  t are as described  in the  previous  sentence.  These 
rates are  easily computed  using  the  definitions  of  rt and  4f because 
fBt  =  H`'  andfBGt  =H  t  if t '  4,  withfBGt  =  Hf-  for t >  t. 
The  face values RTb[t-]  are given  by 
R[]=Ht-lB?H  IB~Gr  fK 
HtB  tfB  ?B  fG(6  Rt[t]  = 
HtfBG  ?  HtIfB  ?  fG 
r  if t <  ty]6 
Rt[t]  = 
H*r  if t 
?E  [Tf 
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The  face values Rf[t]  are given  by 
Ht-  It,  +  HI-  I  +  %G 
Rf [t]  =  WfBG  +  H  fB  ?Gr  if t<t1, 
Ht_'fB  G  +  H  IIfB  -1-fG 
Hilf?H  lr1  f(7) 
_=  IJBG  +  HBt  fB  G  r  ift  E [i  T]. 
Hit'fB  G  ?  H tBfB  +  fG 
Define  the T  element  vector R[t] to be the face value series from  1 to 
I,  where  the first t -  1 elements  (for t =  1, ..  , t -  1) are given by 
Rb[t] and the final elements  (from t to T)  are given by Rf [t]. This is the 
interest  rate series  anticipated  given  the definition  of  t. The  equilib- 
rium value of t is the smallest self-fulfilling  value of t.:  if t =  1 is self- 
fulfilling  in the sense that safe projects are best if R[I]  (i.e., rt =  Rf[1] 
for t =  1, ... .,  T)  is anticipated, then there is not a period of reputation 
acquisition  required  and  t =  1. 
Denote  the present  value of choosing  safe projects from t to T facing 
rates R[i]  as WVt[],  given  by 
Wt-]  E  (G  -  Rf[t])d1+tt  +  (VT  *  d  ). 
t=  t 
As T  oc, the final term approaches  zero, and one  can approximate 
Wit[] arbitrarily closely by Wi[t]: 
WFt^[]  (G  -  Rft])d1~tt. 
t=t 
IfR9[1]  -  W2[1]  ?  (G -  rIB)/(1  -  rI), then rt =  Rf[1] for all t E [1, T], 
and  T --  o  as  T  -*  oo. In  this  case,  reputation  works  immediately. 
Alternatively,  if  R9[1]  -  W2[1] >  (G  -  rIB)/(1  -  II), then  risky 
projects will be selected  at t =  1. Under  the assumption  that markets 
do  not  fail  and  that  (2)  holds,  then  eventually  safe  projects  will be 
selected.  This will occur on the smallest t such that R9[t] -  Wj  [+  I]  ? 
(G  -  LIB)/(1 -  II). Safe  projects will be selected  from  that date  for 
an unbounded  number  of  periods  until T, as T -*  oo. 
This  provides  a characterization  of interest  rates and project deci- 
sions of type BG's up to any fixed  7 <  oc  as TV-- oc,  under the assump- 
tion  that  (2) holds  and  that  markets  do  not  fail.  If  (2) is false,  then 
risky projects  are  selected  each  period  if  markets  do  not  fail.  The 
condition  for markets not to fail is r,  ?  G. If safe projects are best at 
t =  1, there are open  markets if and only if R9[I]  ?  G. If risky projects 
are best at t  =  1, there  are open  markets if and only if R b[  1]  G. 
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optimal  project  at t  =  1 for  type  BG's, Rf[l]  -  W2[1], is a strictly 
increasing  function  of fB  because  higher  fB  implies  higher  interest 
rates at all dates.  Because R'[1]  -  W2[1] is computed  using the inter- 
est  rates  4,  the  condition  does  not  depend  on fBG.  There  are  two 
conditions  for open  markets. The  first, R  [1]  G, does not depend  on 
fBG  but  requiresfB  to be below some positive level. The  second condi- 
tion, Rb[l]  ?  G, requires  an upper  bound  onfB  andfB  +  fBG.  These 
results are used to add conditions  onfB andfBG to the characterization 
of  equilibrium.  Further  comparative  static  properties  of  Rg[l]  - 
W2[1]  are  presented  in Section  VIIA.  Proposition  3 summarizes  our 
characterization. 
PROPOSITION  3.  For  any  fixed  date  T<  oo, there  exists  a horizon 
T <  oo  such that, for all t<  T,  the  following  conditions  hold: 
(a)  If Rg[1]  -  W2[1] '  (G  -  HB)/(1  -  H) and R9[1] ?  G (i.e., fB  is 
sufficiently  low and [2] holds), then there is an immediate  reputation 
equilibrium  in  which  safe  projects  are  selected  for  all t  ?  T,  and 
interest  rates are R[1]. 
(b) If Rg[l]  -  W2[1] >  (G  -  HB)/(1  -  H) and R G[]?C(i.e.,fB  is 
above a positive critical level andfB  +  fBG  is not too high) and (2) 
holds,  then  there is a reputation  acquisition  equilibrium:  BG's choose 
risky projects on dates t < t and safe projects on t E  [1, T), where t is 
the smallest  t such that  Rg[i-]  -  Wt-+ 1[t] ?  (G -  rHB)/(1 -  H). The 
equilibrium  rt is R[l]. 
(c)  If Rg[ I  -  2[ 1] >  (G -  B)/(1  -  H) and R  [1  ]  G (i.e. ,  fBandfB 
+  fBG  are  each  not  too  high)  and  (2)  is false,  then  there  is no 
reputation effect and  BG's select  risky projects  for  all t c  T with 
interest  rates given  by R[T]. 
(d)  If eitherRg4[]  -  ]W2[11  ]<  (G -  HB)/(1  -  H) andRg[1]  >  G (i.e.,fB 
is too high) or R g[]-  W2[1]  >  (G  -  IB)/(l  -  H)  and R b[l]  >  G 
(i.e.,fB  andfB  +  fBG  are each too high and [2] is false), then markets 
fail  on  all t ?  T. 
The  reason  a period  of  reputation  acquisition  in which risky proj- 
ects are selected  may be necessary  is the same as withfBG  =  0: type 
BG's are  pooled  together  with  type  B's, which  leads  to  high  initial 
interest  rates. If there  were very few type B's, then the initial interest 
rates would be low, near r, because rates are low under the conjecture 
that type  BG's choose  safe  projects. The  many type B's lead  to high 
initial rates for all borrowers  that imply a lower present value of rents 
in the  future,  weakening  the  cementing  force  of  a valuable  reputa- 
tion. 
It is the type B's in the initial pool  of borrowers  that cause reputa- 
tion  initially  to  be  too  weak:  adverse  selection  prevents  immediate 
reputation  effects.  The  consequences  of a weak initial reputation  de- REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  857 
pend  on the large number  of type BG's. The  larger iSfBG, the larger 
is the difference  between  the interest  rate rK  that occurs if type BG's 
choose safe projects and rb,  the rate that occurs when they choose risky 
projects. 
A.  A Summary  of Comparative  Statics 
Simple calculations show that each of the following  comparative static 
changes  decreases Rgf 1] -  W2[  1], improving  the relative payoff of the 
risky project  at t  =  1 and  making  it less  likely  that  reputation  will 
provide  incentives  to those  with short track records:  (1) increase  the 
fraction  of type  B's,fB;  (2) decrease  the payment  of the safe project, 
G; (3) increase the payment of the risky project when successful, B; (4) 
increase the riskless interest rate, r; (5) decrease the discount factor, d. 
The  first four changes  increase R  g[]  and (weakly) decrease  W2[1], 
both of which lemma  7 shows improve  the current  relative payoff  of 
the  risky  project.  A  decrease  in  the  discount  factor,  d,  makes  the 
present  value of any fixed  decision  in the future  lower and decreases 
W2[1], and  this  improves  the  relative  payoff  to  selecting  the  risky 
project. 
There  is not an unambiguous  comparative  static effect  on Rg[1]  - 
W2[1]  from  reducing  IB,  the probability of type B's project succeed- 
ing, because a lower  IB implies both that the initial face value Rg[l]  is 
higher and also that Rf [ 1  ] falls at a more rapid rate. These  two effects 
are weighted  by the discount  factor, d. Depending  on the value of d, 
the net effect  can go either  direction.  One  simple result is that given 
pairs  of  fB  and  rIB  that  imply  the  same  value  of  Rg[l],  higher  fB 
combined  with  higher  rIB  improves  the value  of  beginning  with the 
risky project  because  that rate then  falls less rapidly. This  decreases 
W2[1], the  value  of  going  into  period  2  without  a default.  All  the 
comparative  static results above, except  those dealing withfB  and FIB, 
influence  not only R[l]  -  W2[1] but also condition  (2), the condition 
for  reputation  to  have  value  at  some  date.  Reputation  acquisition 
requires Rg[1]  -  W2[1] >  (G -  JIB)/(1 -  Fl) and  (2). The  simplest 
explanation  of when  this is likely to be the case relates to the "amount 
of inequality" in (2), that is, by how much safe projects dominate  risky 
projects when  financed  forever  at the riskless rate of interest.  If (2) is 
close to an equality, then values offB  >  0 and  IB  <  1 that imply even a 
small increase  in interest  rates RM[l] above r in early periods  will tip 
the balance to risky projects because  W2[1]  needs  to be near its max- 
imum possible value, d(G  -  r)/(l  -  d), for safe projects to be best. If, 
instead,  (2) is far from  being  an equality, then reputation  acquisition 
will not be the equilibrium.  This  is because very large values of Rg[1] 
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and  low  rIB  that also imply  rapidly  falling  rates. The  value of R'[1] 
necessary  to  make  risky projects  best at t  =  1 would  exceed  G and 
result instead  in market  failure. 
In summary,  if the maximal value of future  rents is too small, so (2) 
is false, there  will be no reputation  effect.  If there are sufficient  rents 
so that (2) is true and  is far enough  from  being  an equality,  then  an 
active loan market implies  immediate  reputation.  If the rents on safe 
projects are positive  but not exceedingly  large  (and [2] is not too far 
from  an  equality),  then  there  will be reputation  acquisition  in early 
periods  with  risky projects  dominating  if there  is sufficient  adverse 
selection:  if fB and  rB  imply  that the  face value RfT1] is significantly 
above r for  small t. 
VIII.  Conclusion 
The  analysis  of  incentive  problems  in debt  markets  shows  that it is 
likely that these  problems  will be most  severe  in early periods  when 
new firms have short track records.  If there is sufficiently  widespread 
adverse  selection,  the  initial pool of borrowers  will be of low average 
quality and  the  interest  rates for borrowers  with short track records 
will be high.  As a result, the present  value of rents in the future  from 
establishing  a good  reputation  will start out  very low.  Rents  can  be 
sufficiently  low that those  with a choice  of  projects choose  the short- 
run  optimum,  the  risky low-value  project.  A  fraction  of  those  who 
select  the  risky  project  achieve  success  and  are  able  to  continually 
repay  their  loans,  achieving  a  good  reputation.  As  a  borrower 
achieves  a good  reputation,  the  interest  rate  falls,  and  the  present 
value of  rents in the future  from  a good  reputation  rises. Eventually 
these  rents  become  high  enough  for  the  borrower  to  switch  to  the 
long-run  optimum,  the  safe  high-value  project,  for  an  arbitrarily 
large  number  of  periods  until  the  endgame.  Only  if  there  is little 
adverse selection  will reputation  instead work to immediately  provide 
incentives  to  new  borrowers.  The  model  specifies  the  reputation  in 
terms  of  the  credit  rating,  which  is public  information.  Observable 
implications  of  the  model  then  have empirical  content. 
A number of the model's conclusions  are quite general and apply to 
the general  study of reputation  in markets. The  key assumptions  that 
differ  from  the  reputation  model  in  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982a)  are 
that in my model,  actions  are not  observed  and  there  is a nontrivial 
fraction  of  all  agent  types.  If  actions  (project  choices)  are  directly 
observable,  then  unless  there  are incentives  in the first period  to take 
an  action  that  is  beneficial  to  one's  reputation,  there  is  never  any 
incentive  to  take  that  action.  In  terms  of  my model,  once  observed 
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type G. In terms of the chain store in Kreps and Wilson (1982a),  once 
it gives in to an entrant, it can never credibly claim to be "tough." The 
existence  of nontrivial fractions of all types, that is, significant adverse 
selection,  is  important  because  otherwise  the  incentive  effect  of  a 
reputation  would  be near  its maximal  value  in the initial period.  In 
my model,  borrowing  would  begin  at essentially  the  riskless rate of 
interest.  In a more general  setting, for example  a market for goods or 
services of  unobservable  quality,  if there  is significant  adverse  selec- 
tion,  the  market will have low expectations  of initial quality, and the 
market will not pay very high prices for the output of agents without a 
long  record.  This  implies  that  agents  with  short  track records  will 
have a low initial present value of rents in the future, and those with a 
choice  will supply low quality. Only over time, with an acquired  good 
record,  will there be a large present value of rents in the future  from 
maintaining  a good  reputation  by providing  high quality. In addition, 
although  I have not modeled  entry, low initial present value of rents is 
an appealing  notion  in a free-entry  setting. 
The  model  has direct  applications  to examinations  of  differential 
new  project  acceptance  decisions:  firms with certain reputations  will 
turn  down  a given  profitable  project that others  would  accept.  This 
can be interpreted  as a well-defined  cost of capital that is firm specific 
rather than  project specific because  of the private information  about 
project decisions.  In addition,  the  model  can be used  to explain,  on 
the  basis of  public  information,  some  determinants  of  which  firms 
choose  to borrow through  financial intermediaries  and use their dele- 
gated monitoring  services (see Diamond  1988). If the intermediary  (at 
a cost) can help control project decisions,  then the model suggests that 
firms with short  histories  will do  their reputation  acquisition  by bor- 
rowing  from  intermediaries.  Firms with a long-standing  high  credit 
rating will borrow  directly  in the open  market. These  are just  a few 
examples  of  what  I hope  will be a large  harvest  of  extensions  with 
strong  empirical  implications. 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma  4 
Lenders observe the past record of default/liquidation.  Lenders believe the 
following: If there was a past liquidation,  the project  was assumed to return 
less than G that period, and type is assumed to be either B or BG, with 
probabilities  specified by Bayes's law. If there were no liquidations  in any 
previous period when credit was granted, a borrower's  project returned at 
least r each past period (this is implied by lemma 3), and Bayes's  law specifies 
conditional probabilities  across the types that could produce such a record. 
The actions supported by these beliefs are that a default implies no future 
loans (this action is the important one) and a lack of past default leads to 86o  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
future loans if they are at rates that offer an expected return of at least r. It 
turns out that the repayment  decision does not depend on the specification  of 
the action taken when there is no previous default. 
Let V,  2  0 be the beginning of period t present value of expected consump- 
tion of a borrower, making optimal project selection and loan repayment 
decisions from t to T. If a borrower  repays  less than rt,  then Vt+  1 = 0 because 
those who default are not believed to be type G's. For all payments  that avoid 
liquidation, Vt+I is a nonnegative constant. Let Ot be the realization  of the 
project  return of the borrower  in period t (i.e., Ot  E {0, B, G}).  The repayment 
selected at the end of period t by a borrower is Zt: it is subject  to the con- 
straints Zt <  Ot  and Zt 2  0. The  constraints  imply that if Ot =  0 then Zt  =  0. 
Discounted  expected consumption  of the borrower  with  O  2  G :2 r at date t 
for each  of  the three  actions  Zt  =  rt, Zt  >  rt, and  Zt  <  rt is given  by 
payoff  from  Zt  =  rt  payoff  from  Zt >  r,  payoff  from  Zt <  rt 
Ot,  -  rt +  Vt+  I  >  Ot -  Zt +  Vt+l  I  0. 
All borrowers  with Ot  2  rt select Zt  =  rt. Only borrowers with project returns 
less than rt  default, and they pay  Zt  =  0. This implies  that the beliefs above  are 
self-fulfilling  when rt < G. 
For completeness,  consider the case of rt  > G. It might appear that lenders' 
beliefs would be contradicted  by the necessity  of type G's  defaulting if rt > G. 
However, future lenders condition on the fact that a loan was made in a past 
period, and lemma 3 shows that lenders would not lend at date t if rt >  G. 
Proof of Lemma 9 
It is always  feasible to select safe projects  each period, and we know, for t 2  t, 
that rt <  dG +  (1 -  d)(G -  HB)/(1 -  H), implying 
T  T 
T  (G -  rt)dt+  t >  I  {G -  [dG  +  (1-  d)C_  Blldt+1? 
t=i  tt 
Taking the limit of the final expression as T xo  yields 
Id  C-BI  {G  -  dG +  (1I  d)  _I  j 
(  d1  -  d)(1 _  )  {[G(1 -  d)(1 -  )]  +  [(1 -  d)(G -  HBI)]} 
(G  -  1  -  HB) 
This implies that one can find T < x such that the Vt > d{G -  [(G -  HB)/(1 - 
If)]}.  By lemma 7, one can then conclude that safe projects  are optimal  at date 
t. To prove that dG +  (1 -  d)(G -  HB)/(1 -  H) > r if and only if (4) holds, 
dG +  (I  -d)G  HB  d(G  -  G-B  C  +  G-HRB 
dH(B -  G)  +  G -  HB 
1-H  1-H 
>  r 
if and only if (4) holds. Q.E.D. REPUTATION  ACQUISITION  86i 
Proof of Lemma 13 
A mixed  strategy  period  can be continued  on a date on which fB, is close to 
zero  if  r$ >  dG  +  (1  -  d)(G  -  flB)/(1  -  1I),  and  continuing  the  mixed 
strategy  period  reduces  fBG,  at an increasing  rate. This  implies  that a finite 
number of indifference  periods, ending  on date to, will reducefBGt sufficiently 
so, for t E  [t0, T], rt ?  ry'  <  dG +  (1 -  d)(G  -  flB)/(1  -  nI). By lemma 9, there 
exists  T <  o  such  that  Vto :-  d{G  -  [(G  -  fIB)/(1  -  II)]}  =  H, implying  that 
safe projects can be best at to. For such a fixed T, there exists t'  c  T such that 
V,  <  L because  VT <  L by (1). This  implies  that the  mixed  strategy  period 
could  end  on date to such that Vto 2  H or on date t' such that Vti c  L. There 
then exists an ending  date for mixed strategy period t' E  [t , t'] such that V1 E 
[L, H]: choose  the largest ending  date t such that Vt <  L, implying that V,- I 
L. If Vt C  L, then risky projects are selected at t -  1, and by lemma 7, Vt-1 
d{G  -  [(G -  HB)/(1  -  fI)]}  =  dH <  H.  Thus  V,-  I E  [L, H).  QE.D. 
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